Το παρών κείμενο είναι μια ανάλυση της στρατηγικής των Η.Π.Α. απέναντι στο Ιράν και πιο συγκεκριμένα στην πιθανότητα απόκτησης από το τελευταίο πυρηνικών όπλων. Εξετάζει την αλλαγή που θα απιφέρει μια τέτοια πιθανή εξέλιξη στο βαθμό απειλής που ήδη συνιστά το Ιράν για τις Η.Π.Α. Ακολούθως, με βάση τη θεωρία παιγνίων αναλύεται η δυνατότητα αποτρόπης των Η.Π.Α. τόσο ως προς την απόκτηση από το Ιράν πυρηνικών όπλων, όσο και προς τη χρήση τους σε περίπτωση που τελικά τα αποκτήσει. Με βάση τα παραπάνω γίνεται κριτική της μέχρις σήμερον ασκούμενης εκ των Η.Π.Α. πολιτικής πάνω στο συγκεριμένο ζήτημα και διαυπώνονται προτάσεις προς τη βελτίωση αυτής.
The current paper is an examination of the United States’ deterrence strategy towards Iran and its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. It begins with an introduction to the conflict between U.S. and Iran and a description of the policies the two sides have adopted. The next step is to describe the ways that Iran can pose a threat to the U.S. especially in the Middle East. The next task is to analyze the U.S. deterrence strategy and estimate its effectiveness. The points of reference by which the U.S. deterrence strategy and its effectiveness are measured, are: the credibility of the U.S. threats against Iran; and the commitment of the U.S. to these threats. In the following section the possibility of deterring a nuclear-armed Iran is examined. The last section of the paper explores possible measures that the U.S. could use in order to more effectively deter Iran under the current conditions.
Τηλέμαχος Μωραϊτης, CIPT
Η Αποτροπή του Ιράν - Deterring IranThe current paper is an examination of the United States’ deterrence strategy towards Iran and its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. It begins with an introduction to the conflict between U.S. and Iran and a description of the policies the two sides have adopted.
The next step is to describe the ways that Iran can pose a threat to the U.S. especially in the Middle East. Iran is increasing its influence in the Middle East and to that respect four (4) major cases are identified in which Iran can pose a threat to the U.S. interests, independently of nuclear weapons. The underlying assumption is that a nuclear-armed Iran will be more powerful, thus will definitely pose a bigger threat with respect to these four (4) major cases of concern. These cases are: Iran’s ties with the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah and the latter’s facilitation by Iranian aid; Iran’s support of radical Palestinian terrorist groups; Iran’s and Syria’s strong coordination in their foreign policies which complicates the U.S. policy towards Syria; and finally, Iran’s growing influence in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent increase in Iran’s leverage over the world’s oil supply.
The next task is to analyze the U.S. deterrence strategy and estimate its effectiveness. The points of reference by which the U.S. deterrence strategy and its effectiveness are measured, are: the credibility of the U.S. threats against Iran; and the commitment of the U.S. to these threats. Communication is not analyzed, though it is a crucial factor in determining a threat’s effectiveness. However, it is assumed that U.S. has the ability to perfectly communicate its threats to Iran. Furthermore, given the fact that the U.S. is the sole superpower in the current international system the analysis eschew from assessing whether the U.S. has indeed the military power appropriate to carry on its threats. The assumption is that it does. The paper continues with a description of Iran’s bargaining capabilities and the role that its President, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, plays in the bargaining process.
In the following section the possibility of deterring a nuclear-armed Iran is examined. The basic assumption is that this would be a case of asymmetric deterrence. The core debate is whether an Iran with nuclear weapons will have the incentive to use them, or will be deterred by the U.S. The last section of the paper explores possible measures that the U.S. could use in order to more effectively deter Iran under the current conditions.
Introduction to the conflict.For many years Iran has been identified by the United States as one of the main threats in the international system. America was always against the theocratic nature of that Middle Eastern country, and after the religious leaders have taken over power and overthrew the Shah, the U.S. - Iran relations degraded. In 2003 Iran ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allowed the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to enter its nuclear facilities and assess their status. Though Iranian officials stated in public that Iran’s nuclear program was solely for commercial use the U.S. has maintained its suspicions that Iran had a covert program for the production of nuclear material for military use. It was soon after the attacks of 9/11, that U.S. president George. W. Bush spoke of the existence of an “axis of evil” in the world. This “axis” was comprised by three countries, namely Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
In particular, Iran was accused of seeking to develop and/or acquire weapons of mass destruction which would subsequently use to threaten or hurt the U.S. and its allies, primarily in the western world. From then on, the U.S. has attempted to assure that Iran would eschew from developing the materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. The U.N Security Council has several times expressed its deepest concerns with respect to Iran’s nuclear program and urged Iran to accord its policy with the provisions of the NPT. Moreover, the U.S. threatened Iran that in case it developed nuclear weapons it would face severe punishment, meaning war and even a nuclear strike. Still, Iran has not abandoned its nuclear program. Furthermore, Iranian officials, such as President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the chief of the Iranian Military forces have stated that it is Iran’s right to develop and possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, President Ahmadinejad rejected the U.S. accusation with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the position that the Iranian nuclear program was being solely developed for commercial use.
Regardless of whether Iran’s nuclear program is for military or commercial use the critical question remains the same: Were Iran willing to develop a nuclear weapon, would it be capable of doing so? The following question is: Even if Iran is capable of producing the material necessary for the construction of a nuclear weapon, how long will the construction take? There have been many attempts to answer both these questions, but, the conclusion is very arbitrary. There were reports which stated that Iran would be able to possess a nuclear weapon by the end of 2010. Other, more conservative estimations, talked about a period of five (5) to ten (10) years placing the date that Iran would go nuclear sometime in 2015. As a means to perplex the issue even more, recent intelligence reports asserted that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003 . However, they maintained that Iran still has the ability to produce nuclear weapons in the distant future. One of these estimations talked about Iran being in the possession of at least 100 nuclear bombs by 2022....
Τηλέμαχος Μωραϊτης,
Tilemachos Moraitis, MA in Strategic Studies and International Political Economy, SAIS, John Hopkins University
